How not to secure wireless sensor networks revisited: Even if you say it
  twice it's still not secure by Mitchell, Chris J
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
04
43
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  9
 M
ay
 20
20
How not to secure wireless sensor networks
revisited: Even if you say it twice it’s still not secure
Chris J. Mitchell
Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
www.chrismitchell.net
9th May 2020
Abstract
Two recent papers describe almost exactly the same group key es-
tablishment protocol for wireless sensor networks. Quite apart from
the duplication issue, we show that both protocols are insecure and
should not be used — a member of a group can successfully imperson-
ate the key generation centre and persuade any other group member
to accept the wrong key value. This breaks the stated objectives of
the schemes.
1 Introduction
Essentially the same group key establishment protocol aimed at wireless
sensor networks has been presented in two published papers, [1, 2], both of
which appeared online in early 2016. The sets of authors of the two papers
are slightly different, although three names (Hsu, Harn and Zhang) appear
as authors of both papers. Thus it is clearly no accident that the same
material has been published twice. To clarify matters, the papers are as
follows:
• Paper A, [1], by Hsu, Harn, He and Zhang;
• Paper B, [2], by Hsu, Harn, Mu, Zhang and Zhu.
Paper A [1] was submitted on January 11th 2016 and accepted for publi-
cation on March 2nd 2016. The date of submission of Paper B [2] is not
given but it was published online on February 2nd 2016. It thus seems likely
that the two papers were submitted and revised at very similar times. It is
noteworthy that neither paper refers to the other.
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The fact that the same material has been published twice is clearly dis-
turbing. The duplication of publications is somehow made worse by the
fact that, as we discuss below, the scheme described is obviously insecure.
This was pointed out in a short arXiv document I uploaded in March 2018
[4], which refers to Paper B. However, at the time the note was written I
was unaware of Paper A, discovering which has motivated me to write this
further note.
The title of this document implicitly refers to another paper, [5], which de-
scribes attacks against three very closely-related key predistribution schemes,
also aimed at wireless sensor networks. There is a significant overlap in
authorship between the three papers considered there and the two papers
considered here. It might be that a pattern of behaviour can be discerned.
The remainder of this short paper is structured as follows. §2 provides a
brief description of the scheme in Paper A, and the trivial differences from
the scheme in Paper B are also noted. An attack against this scheme is
outlined in §3. Brief concluding remarks are given in §4.
2 The Hsu-Harn-He-Zhang scheme
The scheme described in Hsu et al. [1] operates as follows. The description
below is based closely on reference [4]. The following requirements apply;
note that we have made minor changes to the notation of Hsu et al. [1] for
consistency with the March 2018 analysis, [4].
• The protocol works for a set of users U = {Ui}, all registered with a
KGC trusted by all users to generate and distribute secret keys.
• All participants agree on a large integer m = pq, where p and q are
distinct large safe primes. Hsu et al. require all computations to take
place in a (sic) finite field K with m elements. Of course, such a
finite field cannot exist, so we assume instead that calculations are
performed in the commutative ring Zm
1; the scheme will work with
very high probability in such a ring, because the probability of ran-
domly choosing a ring element which does not have a multiplicative
inverse is vanishingly small given that p and q are large. Indeed, if
this wasn’t true then factoring RSA moduli would be easy! This is
the first of two minor differences from the scheme presented in Paper
B, [2], where it is assumed that calculations take place in a field of p
elements for a large prime p.
• The participants must also agree a cryptographic hash-function h.
1The fact that this is what was intended byt he authors becomes clear later in the
paper, where there are references to calculations being performed ‘mod m’.
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• All participants must agree on the function vw : Zm → (Zm)
w+1
defined by:
vw(x) = (1, x, x
2, . . . , xw)
(where w ≥ 2).
• Every user Ui must have a unique identifier IDi and a secret key xi ∈
Zm shared with the KGC.
Now suppose an initiator wishes to arrange for a new secret key to be
shared by the members of a group of users U ′ (U ′ ⊆ U), where U ′ =
{Uz1 , Uz2 , . . . , Uzt} for some t ≥ 2.
The protocol proceeds as follows (where all arithmetic is computed in Zm).
1. The initiator sends a request to the KGC with the list of t identifiers
{IDi : i ∈ U
′}.
2. The KGC broadcasts the list of identifiers {IDi : i ∈ U
′} in response.
3. Each user Uj ∈ U
′ chooses a fresh random challenge rj ∈ Zm and sends
it to the KGC.
4. The KGC performs the following steps.
(a) The KGC randomly chooses a group key S ∈ Zm and a value
r0 ∈ Zm, and assembles the (t+ 1)-tuple r = (r0, r1, r2, . . . , rt).
(b) For every i (1 ≤ i ≤ t) the KGC now computes the inner product
si = (vt(xzi , r).
The KGC also computes ui = S−si. Note that this represents the
second minor difference from the scheme in Paper B, [2], where
si is instead calculated as:
si = (vt(xzi + h1(xzi ||ri||r0)), r)
where || denotes concatenation of bit strings and h1 is an appro-
priate cryptographic hash function.
(c) The KGC now computes the tag Auth as
Auth = h(S||ID1||ID2|| . . . ||IDt||r0||r1||r2|| . . . ||rt||u1||u2|| . . . ||ut)
where in assembling the input to h, elements of Zm are converted
to bit strings using an agreed representation.
(d) Finally, the KGC broadcasts
Auth, r0, (u1, u2, . . . , ut)
to all members of the group U ′.
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5. On receiving the broadcast, user Uzi ∈ U
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ t):
(a) computes
si = (vt(xzi , r))
using its secret key xzi , the random challenges ri (1 ≤ i ≤ t) sent
earlier in the protocol, and the broadcast value r0;
(b) computes the group key as S = ui + si; and finally
(c) verifies Auth by recomputing it using the newly computed group
key and the values received in the protocol.
3 Analysis
The analysis of the protocol precisely follows the analysis in the 2018 note
[4]. We suppose a ‘victim user’ Uv is a member of a group of t users for
which a new key is requested, and that one of the users, Ux say, in the group
U ′ is malicious. We also assume that Ux can control the channel between
the KGC and the victim user Uv so that Ux can modify what Uv receives in
the final KGC broadcast in step 4d. As we show below, Ux is able to make
Uv accept a key S
∗ of Ux’s choice.
We suppose that the protocol proceeds as described in section 2, where
Uv, Ux ∈ U
′. In step 4d, Ux prevents the broadcast from the KGC reaching
Uv. Because Ux is a valid member of U
′, Ux can calculate the secret key S
generated and distributed by the KGC. Ux now chooses a different secret
key S∗ ∈ K, and computes
u∗v = uv − S + S
∗
and
Auth∗ = h2(S
∗||ID1 . . . ||IDt||r0||r1|| . . . ||rt||u1|| . . . ||uv−1||u
∗
v||uv+1|| . . . ||ut).
That is, Auth∗ is computed using the same inputs as Auth except that S
and uv are switched to S
∗ and u∗v. Ux now sends a modified version of the
KGC’s broadcast to Uv, where Auth and uv are replaced by Auth
∗ and u∗v.
It is straightforward to see that victim user Uv will compute the secret key
as S∗, and the tag Auth∗ will verify. The attack is complete.
4 Concluding remarks
Apart from the double publication issue, it is difficult to go much beyond
the conclusions of the 2018 note [4]. Neither Paper A not Paper B provide a
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rigorous security proof using state of the art ‘provable security’ techniques,
nor do they give a formal security model. This certainly helps to explain
why fundamental flaws exist. Indeed, the following observation of Liu et al.
[3] regarding a number of previously proposed but flawed group key estab-
lishment protocols is highly relevant. ‘The security proof for each vulnerable
GKD protocol only relies on incomplete or informal arguments. It can be
expected that they would suffer from attacks’. We conclude that, although
it might be tempting to try to repair the protocol to address the issues
identified, unless a version can be devised with an accompanying security
proof (which may well not be possible without significantly increasing the
complexity) this would be foolhardy since there is a strong chance that flaws
will remain.
The American philosopher and psychologist William James (1842-1910) re-
putedly said ‘There’s nothing so absurd that if you repeat it often enough,
people will believe it’2. Clearly in this case twice is not enough times!
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